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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 to halt discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Realizing, however, that
some employment situations exist in which these attributes could be a necessary job
requirement, Congress also included section 703(e) in Title VII. 2 This section is the
bona fide occupational qualification (hereinafter BFOQ) and permits gender-based
job qualifications 3 if a person's sex is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
a particular business. 4
The BFOQ has been viewed as a very narrow exception to the general rule
forbidding discrimination. 5 Although it has arisen in various settings, this Comment
will concentrate on the area of guard positions in penal institutions. Traditionally,
when guard positions involve high inmate contact, they have been restricted to
members of the same sex as that of the inmate population. With the passage of Title
VII, female as well as male correction officers began filing suit claiming that the
prison administrator's refusal to place them in high contact positions with inmates of
the opposite sex constituted sex discrimination.
The federal courts have abused their discretion in cases dealing with state prison
systems. These courts have utilized a strict scrutiny standard, which places upon
prison administrators the burden of proving that they are unable to accommodate
equal employment opportunity concerns in the prison setting before a BFOQ defense
will be considered. 6 This standard of review is contrary to the rational relationship
test traditionally employed by the federal courts when dealing with claims arising in
the state prison setting. The rational relationship standard requires the court to limit
its review to the issue whether the Constitution has been violated and to presume that
the actions of the prison administrator are reasonable in the absence of clear testi-
mony that they are not.7 Although this standard traditionally has been employed in
cases of inmates against the prison administrator, it should be equally applicable in
cases brought by guards against the prison administrator. The rationale of the Su-
preme Court, the states' interests in penological objectives, and society's attitudes
toward privacy rights support the proposition that in sex discrimination cases brought
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d,
2000a to 2000h-6 (1976)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
3. It also permits qualifications based on religion or national origin; however, this Comment is restricted to the
gender-based classification.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
5. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1983).
6. See infra notes 30-62 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 113-27 and accompanying text.
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by state prison guards, the federal courts should defer to the states' executive and
legislative branches of the government.
Additionally, even if the federal courts were to refuse to apply a deference
standard in equal employment opportunity cases arising in the prison setting, the
courts' present approach fails to balance properly the competing interests. When a
guard files suit claiming sex discrimination in job assignments, the prison administra-
tor usually raises the BFOQ defense based upon security concerns and inmates'
privacy rights. The federal courts have restricted the BFOQ defense to security
concerns and inmates' rights only in so far as security is affected.8 Without consider-
ing what constitutional rights an inmate might have, the federal courts have ruled that
any rights retained by inmates must give way to the rights of the guards.9 When an
inmate files suit against the prison claiming that guards of the opposite sex have
violated his or her right to privacy, the federal courts find equal employment opportu-
nity to be the interest advanced by the prison administrator10 when the actual interest
of the prison administrator is prison security. By resorting to the deference standard,
the court can find the administrator's actions reasonable. These approaches confuse
the actual issues that are before the court.
In a suit brought by guards alleging sex discrimination, the competing interests
are a person's statutory right to equal job opportunities and an inmate's constitutional
right to privacy. Because the claim arises in a prison setting, the court must balance
the interests keeping in mind the primary purposes of a prison-security, rehabilita-
tion, and deterrence."' In a suit brought by inmates, the competing interests are an
inmate's constitutional right to privacy and the prison administrator's need to take
reasonable measures to insure security. In neither case should the prison administra-
tor have to advance a guard's statutory right to equal job opportunities, although this
is the federal courts' approach. In both situations the courts consider the state interest
of providing equal job opportunities to be of overriding concern. However, equal job
opportunities are not the administrator's primary concern; rather, they are tangential
to the prison's primary purposes.
The present approach taken by the federal courts assures that a guard's statutory
right to equal employment opportunities will be considered fully whether a suit is
brought by prison guards or inmates, but does not provide the same consideration to
an inmate's rights. This approach leaves the prison administrator with inadequate
guidelines regarding the parameters of an inmate's rights. Furthermore, it creates
additional litigation by inmates who later file suit claiming a violation of their con-
stitutional right to privacy when guards of the opposite sex are posted in areas where
inmates can be viewed in the nude, partially undressed, or performing bodily func-
tions. In addition, this approach derogates inmates' rights. By failing to consider
properly the inmates' rights in the first instance, the federal courts refuse to recognize
a BFOQ and mandate that guards be hired regardless of sex. When an inmate subse-
8. See, e.g., Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966
(1980); Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center, 520 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
9. See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 90-111 and accompanying text.
11. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974).
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quently files suit, his or her constitutional rights already have been seriously circum-
scribed, although the inmate was never a party to the first action.
The purpose of this Comment is to outline a procedure that would limit the role
played by the federal courts in equal employment opportunity cases arising in a state
prison setting and allow for a proper balancing of the competing interests. The
Comment begins with an analysis of the standards of review employed by the federal
courts in cases in which guards claim a denial of their equal employment opportunity
rights and cases in which inmates claim that the use of guards of the opposite sex in
certain areas of the prison violates their constitutional right to privacy. Next, the
Comment discusses the standard of review that should be followed and the need for
prison administrators to represent the inmates' rights when the inmates are not party
to the suit. Finally, the Comment analyzes the problems that have arisen from the
failure of the federal courts to apply a deference standard and to consider an inmate's
constitutional right of privacy and how utilization of the proferred approach can
resolve these difficulties.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW UTILIZED BY FEDERAL COURTS
A. Analysis of Sex Discrimination Claims by Guards in the Prison Setting
The BFOQ exception reads in pertinent part as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter (1) it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees.., on the basis
of ... sex ... in those certain instances where ... sex ... is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise .... 12
When the BFOQ defense is raised, a prima facie case of sex discrimination is
established since the employer is admitting sex to be a criterion in job selection. 13 By
1977 two basic tests had evolved to determine the analysis to be applied in order to
recognize a BFOQ and, therefore, that the employer was not in violation of Title VII.
The first test was set out by the Fifth Circuit in Weeks v. Southern Bell Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co.14 In Weeks a woman filed suit claiming she was denied the
position of telephone/telegraph switch operator on the basis of her sex. Noting that it
was "dealing with a humanitarian remedial statute which serves an important public
purpose,"1 5 the court placed the burden of proving the applicability of the BFOQ
exception upon the person (the employer) claiming it. Based upon legislative intent,
the court found the exception to be a very narrow one.' 6 The employer had the burden
of proving that he had a reasonable cause, that is, a factual basis for believing that all
or substantially all women would be unable to perform the duties of the job safely and
efficiently.' 7 The restriction used by the employer was based upon weight lifting
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
13. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977).
14. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
15. Id. at 232.
16. Id. at 232 n.3 (the court cited an interpretative memorandum by Senators Clark and Chase. 110 CONG. REC.
7213 (1964) and H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963)).
17. 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
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requirements and the employer's belief that the job was too strenuous for a woman.
The court found this to be a stereotypical characterization and, therefore, that the
employer had failed to meet his burden. The court held that whether a job was too
dangerous or too difficult for a woman was for the woman, not the employer, to
decide. 18 Accordingly, the test in Weeks is to deny the BFOQ exception when it is
based upon stereotyped characterizations rather than upon a factual basis.
The second test was also set out by the Fifth Circuit in Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways.19 In Diaz a man brought suit claiming he was denied a flight cabin
attendant position on the basis of his sex. The court developed the business necessity
test, which established that discrimination based on sex was valid only when the
essence (primary purpose) of the business would be undermined by not hiring mem-
bers of one sex exclusively. 20 The court first determined that the primary purpose of
an airline was to safely transport passengers from one point to another. The airline's
argument of customer preference for female attendants therefore failed because this
was tangential rather than essential to the defendant's primary purpose.21
Accordingly, when the Supreme Court's first and only case dealing with the
BFOQ exception was granted certiorari, the test, in essence, placed the burden upon
the employer to show that (1) a factual basis existed for believing that substantially all
members of one sex could not perform the job properly rather than a preconceived
notion of stereotyped characterization and (2) the duties were necessary to the busi-
ness and not merely collateral. The Supreme Court case of Dothard v. Rawlinson"2
was a class action on behalf of women claiming discrimination because they were
denied guard positions in Alabama's male maximum security prisons. The District
Court for the Middle District of Alabama had rejected defendants' BFOQ defense
relying on the view of the federal courts that this provided only the narrowest of
exceptions to the general rule requiring equality of employment opportunities. 23
Based on the fact that women were allowed to work in the minimum and medium
security male penal institutions, the court held that defendants' BFOQ defense was a
pretext. The court further found that any inmate privacy rights could be resolved by
rearranging work assignments.2 4 The Supreme Court agreed that the BFOQ was a
narrow exception.2 5 Referring to Weeks and Diaz, the Court noted that whatever the
verbal formulation might be, the federal courts were in agreement that it was im-
permissible under Title VII to refuse to hire a person on the basis of stereotyped
characterizations of the sexes.2 6 In deciding Dothard, however, the Court explained
that the general proposition that it was for a woman to decide whether to accept the
risks of a position did not apply in this case. If, by reason of a guard's sex, the
security of the institution would be undermined, then the prison's security must be
given preference.
18. Id. at 236.
19. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
20. Id. at 388.
21. Id.
22. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
23. Mieth v. Dothard, 418 F. Supp. 1169, 1179, aoffd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Dothard v. Rawlinson.
433 U.S. 321 (1977).
24. Id. at 1185.
25. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
26. Id. at 333.
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In the usual case, the argument that a particular job is too dangerous for women may
appropriately be met by the rejoinder that it is the purpose of Title VII to allow the
individual woman to make that choice for herself. More is at stake in this case, however,
than an individual woman's decision to weigh and accept the risks of employment in a
"contact" position in a maximum security male prison.27
The Court concluded that the primary purpose of a correctional counselor's job
was to maintain security. In this case evidence of extreme violence, understaffing,
lack of segregation of prisoners by offense, and constitutionally intolerable prison
conditions was presented to the Court.2 ' The Court held that in these circumstances a
woman's ability to maintain security might be directly reduced by reason of her sex.
The Court, therefore, upheld the BFOQ and did not require the prison administrator
to take remedial measures in order to employ females.2 9 Unlike the district court, the
Supreme Court did not treat the defendants' differentiation between maximum and
medium/minimum security prisons as a pretext. The Court did not deal with the issue
of an inmate's right to privacy because it decided in favor of the BFOQ.
One of the difficulties that has arisen from Dothard is uncertainty regarding the
standard employed by the Court. Dothard can be read as deferring to the prison
administrator's decision that, based upon the circumstances of this case, a BFOQ was
a reasonable way to resolve the problem of prison security. Alternatively, Dothard
can be read as the Court's independent conclusion that a BFOQ was proper and can
be restricted to its facts. The federal courts have followed and developed the latter
formulation.
Accordingly, federal courts have confined Dothard to its facts, have refused to
recognize a BFOQ absent identical Dothard conditions, and have made their own,
independent conclusion regarding prison conditions and the remedies to be un-
dertaken by the prison administrators. For example, in Manley v. Mobile County,3
0
one of the first cases to deal with the BFOQ exception after Dothard, a female
plaintiff brought suit claiming sex discrimination because of defendant's refusal to
hire her as an identification assistant officer at the county jail.31 The sheriff testified
that (1) extraordinary conditions of overcrowding existed (a statewide court order had
restricted the number of prisoners that could be sent to the state penitentiary); (2) over
half of the inmates were felons who had committed crimes of violence; (3) escapes
and disruptions occurred frequently; (4) hostages had been taken; and (5) officers had
been stabbed and assaulted.3 2 The District Court for the Southern District of Alabama
held that the facts of this case were not comparable to those in Dothard and that the
BFOQ defense was not applicable.33 In the court's opinion, whenever a security
threat did arise, a male guard could be posted to remain in the identification room
while the female guard performed her duties. 34
This same analysis was applied in Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory.35
27. Id. at 335 (footnote omitted).
28. Id. at 335-36.
29. Id. at 336.
30. 441 F. Supp. 1351 (S.D. Ala. 1977).
31. Id. at 1353.
32. Id. at 1354.
33. Id. at 1358.
34. Id. at 1359.
35. 462 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979), affld, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
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In Gunther, a female plaintiff claimed discrimination on the basis of sex for failure to
promote her above the position of correction officer II at the Men's Reformatory at
Anamosa.36 The suit originally had been brought in state court.3 7 On appeal, the
Iowa Supreme Court held that under Iowa law a BFOQ existed for the correction
officer II classification."8 Plaintiff then filed in federal court on the basis of Title
VII.39 The prison administrator claimed that placing women in the correction officer
II classification (an inmate contact position) would (1) violate the inmates' privacy
rights; (2) jeopardize prison security and rehabilitative programs; (3) put the guards,
both male and female, in increased danger; (4) lead to major disciplinary problems;
and (5) create serious administrative problems in trying to make assignments that
would avoid these problems without treating male officers unfairly.40 The District
Court for the Northern District of Iowa, in a decision that was affirmed by the Eighth
Circuit, disagreed with the administrator's resolution of the problem and disallowed
the BFOQ. 4' The court found that the conditions at Anamosa were not comparable to
the conditions set out in Dothard4 2 and that the issue of inmates' privacy rights was
not properly before the court.43
In Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center44 plaintiff, a female
rehabilitation specialist, claimed discrimination on the basis of sex because the center
had refused to transfer her to the male quarters of the center after notifying her that
the female quarters were being eliminated.45 The superintendent of the center argued
that due to budgetary constraints, each staff specialist had to be able to perform all job
functions and therefore he was unable to accommodate inmate privacy rights. 46 He
further argued that he had based his need for a BFOQ not only upon budgetary
constraints but also upon his personal observation that the physical layout of the
center would enable female employees to view male inmates who were disrobing. 47
The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio disagreed and found that job
assignments could be rearranged. 48 It also said that any opinion of the administrator
regarding violations of inmates' privacy rights could be disregarded because it was
based upon speculation rather than fact. 49 Accordingly, the court disallowed the
BFOQ. 50
36. Id. at 954.
37. The lower court case was not reported.
38. Iowa Dep't. of Social Serv. v. Iowa Merit Employment Dep't., 261 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1977).
39. 462 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979), affd, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
40. Id. at 955.
41. Id. at 957.
42. Conditions at Anamosa were not found to be constitutionally intolerable. The inmate population was only
composed of 3.3% sex offenders, id. at 954, n. 1, as compared to the 10% finding in Dothard. In addition, Anamosa was a
medium rather than maximum security prison. Id. at 955.
43. Guntherv. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1070, 1087 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
44. 520 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
45. Id. at 771.
46. Id. at 772.
47. Id. at 775.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 782.
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In Hardin v. Stynchcomb5 1 a female plaintiff brought suit claiming sex dis-
crimination for defendant's refusal to hire her as a deputy sheriff.5 2 For training and
morale purposes, defendant had a policy of requiring deputy sheriffs to work their
first six months in the jail before assigning jobs connected with the public. Conse-
quently, the sheriff would hire female deputies only when contact positions were
available in the female section of the jail, allegedly in order to protect inmates' rights
to privacy.5 3 The sheriff also claimed that the jail met the conditions of a maximum
security institution with violent and overcrowded conditions and that employing
women in the male section would threaten jail security. 5 4 The court disagreed. It did
not believe that security would be undermined if women worked in the male section
of the jail. The court found that women would help to normalize the prison environ-
ment and that defendant could modify his rotation system to avoid any clashes with
inmates' privacy rights.55 Accordingly, the BFOQ was disallowed.56
Finally, in Griffin v. Michigan Department of Corrections,57 female plaintiffs
brought suit claiming defendant's policy of refusing to allow women to work in its
three male maximum security prisons constituted sex discrimination. 58 The prison
administrator's position was that having women in these institutions posed a security
risk due to the character of the inmate population. He further argued that because of
the security measures taken at the maximum security prisons,5 9 allowing women
employees in the male prisons would be a violation of the inmate's right to privacy.
60
The court disagreed. It found the prisons did not meet Dothard conditions, an in-
mate's right to privacy was of no concern, and women could have a normalizing
effect on the prison environment.6 1 Accordingly, the BFOQ was disallowed.62
Each of these cases reflects a substitution by the federal court of its own opinion
for that of the prison administrator's. The cases show a very narrow reading of
Dothard and a refusal to consider the applicability of a BFOQ in circumstances that
are not identical to those in Dothard in spite of the fact that cases since Dothard have
raised the issue of an inmate's right to privacy-an issue with which the Court in
Dothard did not deal. Accordingly, federal courts, while performing their own,
51. 691 F.2d 1364 (1lth Cir. 1982).
52. Id. at 1365.
53. Id. at 1367.
54. Id. at 1367, n.9. It is understood that regardless of the standard of review employed by the courts, a final
determination is inevitably based upon the credence the court gives to the evidence presented. Hardin may have failed
even if the court had followed a deference standard. For some interesting reading, see id. at 1370, n.20 where the court
quotes part of the testimony of L. B. Eason, the Chief Jailer at the Fulton County Sheriff's Department. In addition to
explaining the psychological differences between men and women based upon Adam and Eve in the garden of paradise he
explains that "God created a lady for men to love and cherish and I cannot imagine any woman wanting to put herself in
the position of a man." Id.
55. Id. at 1373.
56. Id. at 1374.
57. 31 Empl. Prec. Dec. (CCH) T 33,482 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 1982).
58. Id. at 29,212.
59. Strip searches were part of the regular routine, id. at 29,216, and unannounced security checks were frequently
made. Id. at 29,211.
60. Id. at 29,217.
61. Id. at 29,222.
62. Id.
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independent evaluation of prison conditions, also must reach a determination of the
extent of an inmate's right to privacy.
In this context, the federal courts have either avoided the issue of inmates'
privacy rights by refusing to deal with it, 63 have restricted their analysis to how prison
security might be affected, 64 or, as was done by the court in Griffin, have decided that
no right exists. The federal court's refusal to deal with the privacy issue is reflected in
several cases. In Hardin v. Stynchcomb65 the Eleventh Circuit required the defendant
to modify its rotation system but never advised the defendant of what privacy rights
the inmates might have. Rather than specifically dealing with the privacy issue, the
court limited its comments to examples of what it might consider a privacy invasion.
"[T]he inmates' retained privacy rights may be unnecessarily invaded by having
deputies of the opposite sex conduct strip or body cavity searches, or oversee use of
toilet and shower facilities.' '66 In Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center67
the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio commented that even if privacy
issues had been directly raised, the court would have declined to rule upon them
because they were based upon speculation rather than actual claims.
68
An alternative approach adopted by the federal courts to avoid the issue of
inmate privacy rights is to hold that prison administrators do not have standing to
raise the claim of an inmate's right to privacy. Under this approach, the court deals
with the privacy issue only to the extent that it affects the administrator's concern for
prison security. In Harden the court explained:
To the extent that evaluation of the validity of defendant's bfoq defense has necessitated
the general consideration of privacy rights, the Court has done so, but has carefully
refrained from indicating either the precise extent of the privacy interests herein, or in
what manner those interests might be invaded by the hiring of female guards.
69
In Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory70 the District Court for the North-
ern District of Iowa, in a decision that was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit, com-
mented, "It is not clear that these rights [inmates' privacy] may be raised by de-
fendants except as they relate to order and other legitimate purposes of the in-
stitution." 7' The district court noted that if the issue were actually before it, further
proceedings would be required. The court found it unnecessary to reach the privacy
63. See, e.g., Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1982); Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation
Center, 520 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
64. See, e.g., Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center, 520 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Gunther v.
Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979), affd, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 966 (1980).
65. 691 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1982).
66. Id. at 1373.
67. 520 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
68. Id. at 782.
69. Id. at 781.
70. 462 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979), affd, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
71. 462 F. Supp. 952, 956, n.4 (N.D. Iowa 1979).
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question because the female plaintiff was seeking a guard position with limited
functions.7
2
A final judicial approach adopted to avoid the issue of inmates' privacy rights
was employed by the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in Griffin v.
Michigan Department of Corrections.7 3 Relying upon a footnote in Gunther and a
decision by the California Superior Court of San Luis Obisbo County, the court
decided that "[i]nmates do not possess any protected right under the Constitution
against being viewed while naked by correction officers of the opposite sex." 74 The
court further stated that defendant's claim on behalf of the inmates was merely a ploy
to justify sexual discrimination in hiring and promotion policies in state correction
facilities. "Defendants have deliberately formulated their work assignment and pro-
motional policies to produce a direct conflict between the inmates' right to minimal
privacy and Plaintiffs' equal employment opportunities as mandated by Title VII."71
An understanding of the standard used by the federal courts to judge sex dis-
crimination suits and the extent to which the courts will consider an inmate's right to
privacy reveals a necessary result of the courts' approach. Because the federal courts
are dealing with the issue of equal employment opportunity, the courts believe they
should apply their own, independent evaluation of how the competing interests of
inmate privacy and equal employment opportunity best can be reconciled. 76 By
refusing to consider the scope of an inmate's right to privacy and holding that the
courts' perceived penological concern of equal employment opportunities is para-
mount to inmate privacy rights, the courts can require prison administrators to take
remedial measures that depreciate the inmate's interests in privacy and can avoid
deciding whether such measures are appropriate until an inmate files suit. This failure
to consider fully an inmate's right to privacy also permits the courts to strike down
the BFOQ defense by restricting its BFOQ analysis to the stereotyped characteriza-
tion test of Weeks7 7 and the primary purpose test of Diaz.7 8
The federal courts consistently have applied this analysis. In Gunther v. Iowa
State Men's Reformatory79 the District Court for the Northern District of Iowa held
that plaintiff was entitled to a correction officer position that did not involve conduct-
ing strip searches or viewing the inmates while showering or using toilet facilities.8 0
This could be accomplished by rearranging job assignments. A BFOQ was held not
proper because (1) defendant's fear of a female's impact on prison discipline was
highly speculative and based upon stereotypical views (the Weeks test); and (2) the
72. Id. In the state action, plaintiff had requested assignment to the position of CO I. The court refused to modify
the classification so that plaintiff would be allowed to perform some but not all of the CO II duties. Iowa Dep't of Social
Serv. v. Iowa Merit Employment Dep't, 261 N.W.2d 161, 162 (Iowa 1977). When plaintiff filed in federal court she
sought CO n1 status with a functional assignment of duties so as to protect any rights of inmate privacy which might exist.
Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1086 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
73. 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,482 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 1982).
74. Id. at 29,221.
75. Id. at 29,222.
76. See supra notes 30-62 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
79. 462 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979), affd, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
80. Id. at 955.
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primary purpose of the prison (surveillance) would not be undermined if job assign-
ments were rearranged (the Diaz test).8'
In Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center82 the District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio held that plaintiff was entitled to retain her position as a
rehabilitation specialist I at the center, although the female quarters had been
abolished.83 The court felt that the administrator could take appropriate measures to
minimize privacy violations such as restricting job assignments, installing shower
doors, or providing the inmates with appropriate sleepwear. A BFOQ was held not
proper because (1) defendant admitted women could handle the job if it were not for
budgetary constraints84 (the Weeks test), and (2) defendant's belief that privacy rights
would be violated was based upon speculation and therefore did not provide a proper
basis for claiming the primary purpose of the prison would be undermined85 (the Diaz
test).
The same approach was taken in Hardin v. Stynchcomb.86 In Hardin the
Eleventh Circuit found that defendant could modify its rotation policy despite de-
fendant's claim to the contrary. 87 A BFOQ was held not proper because (1) adjusting
job assignments would defeat the claim women could not handle the job based on
inmate privacy claims88 (the Weeks test), and (2) defendant's policy of requiring
deputies to work in the county jail for six months was not the essence of the sheriff's
business89 (the Diaz test).
B. Analysis of Inmates' Claims of Violations of Privacy Rights by Guards of the
Opposite Sex
Inmates' claims of privacy violations by guards of the opposite sex have arisen
after the prison administrators have attempted to implement the court's orders by
employing guards of both sexes. Forts v. Ward was the first case to deal directly with
this conflict. 90 In Forts female inmates claimed a violation of their rights to privacy
and sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin assignment of male guards to duties in
housing and hospital units. Defendants had assigned guards to positions regardless of
sex. 9' Both the District Court for the Southern District of New York and the Second
Circuit made their own, independent determinations how the inmates' privacy rights
could be reconciled with equal employment opportunity interests. Each court found
that the proper approach was to determine whether an accommodation could be
81. Id. 956, n.4, and 957.
82. 520 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
83. Id. at 782. Defendants claimed that plaintiff should not be reinstated because she was totally disabled due to
injuries received prior to the court's decision. The court remanded the case to the magistrate for the sole purpose of
determining what remedies could properly be afforded to the plaintiff. Id.
84. Id. at 772.
85. Id. at 775.
86. 691 F.2d 1364 (llth Cir. 1982).
87. Id. at 1373.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1372.
90. 471 F. Supp. 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated and remanded, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980).
91. 621 F.2d 1210, 1212 (2d Cir. 1980).
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made before deciding whether one interest had to be vindicated to the detriment of
the other.92 Because each court believed it had reached a proper accommodation, the
question of whether a BFOQ would be proper never needed to be considered. Be-
cause each court was basing its opinion on its own perception of the facts rather than
upon the views of the prison administrator, the courts disagreed over the best way to
reconcile the interests. 93
The lower court held that male guards could not be assigned to locations where
inmates could be viewed completely or partially unclothed, to night shifts, or to the
first morning count. The court recommended defendant to install smoky or mottled
glass at the showers to protect inmates from being viewed by guards of the opposite
sex. In the court's opinion:
While some out-of-the-ordinary steps are justifiable to reconcile the conflicting
rights here, to require of an inmate extensive artificial procedure to preserve
minimal human dignity in order to enable a man to be her guard at such time is,
in itself, a dimunition of that dignity and is, in my opinion, too high a price to
pay for the equality of job opportunity .... "
The appellate court disagreed. Without considering whether the lower court's
opinion justified a BFOQ and, therefore, was not in violation of Title VII, the
appellate court held that refusing to allow male guards to work night shifts was a
denial of equal employment opportunities for both the male and female guards. 95 The
court found that providing appropriate sleepwear to inmates could resolve the con-
flict. Thus, inmates would be properly clothed when viewed by a guard of the
opposite sex, and no privacy problem would exist. Guards then could fill positions
regardless of sex and satisfy equal employment opportunity requirements. The court
of appeals felt that the lower court had failed to explore the range of sleepwear
available. 96
Although Forts recognized that inmates were entitled to some measure of priva-
cy, the federal courts' emphasis on equal employment opportunities has been accom-
panied by a continuing derogation of inmates' privacy rights. Prison administrators'
reluctance to impose a BFOQ on guard positions has caused further deterioration of
these rights. As long as federal courts fail to consider the inmate's constitutional right
to privacy and limit their review to prison security, the scales will be unfairly
balanced in favor of equal employment opportunity. This biased balancing approach
seriously hampers the ability of the inmate to present a constitutional claim in a
subsequent suit.
This derogation of rights is reflected in Smith v. Fairman.97 In Smith an inmate
challenged the prison rules which allowed female guards to conduct "frisk"
92. 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); 621 F.2d 1210, 1212 (2d Cir. 1980).
93. 621 F.2d 1210, 1216-17 (2d Cir. 1980).
94. 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
95. 621 F.2d 1210, 1216 (2d Cir. 1980).
96. Id. at 1217. Arguing over sleepwear is just the type of minutiae that concerned the Supreme Court in Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
97. 678 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1879 (1983).
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searches98 of male inmates. The Seventh Circuit's analysis began with the proposi-
tion that absent Dothard conditions, a state could not legally refuse to hire a guard on
the basis of sex, regardless of the position. 99 The court failed to consider that the
Court in Dothard did not deal with the issue of an inmate's right to privacy and,
therefore, left open the question whether this would constitute the kind of particular
circumstances necessary to justify a BFOQ. The Smith court found that the only
privacy to which the inmate was entitled was not having his genitals, the "final
bastion of privacy," touched by members of the opposite sex. ' 0 This conclusion
was based upon the premise that even if an inmate retains rights, these rights neces-
sarily must be diminished by the central need of prison authorities to maintain
institutional security. This was combined with the belief that the state was required to
hire women as guards and, therefore, must be allowed to utilize them to the fullest
extent possible. The court therefore decided that plaintiff's privacy rights were lim-
ited to his genitals and that, by forbidding female guards from touching them, the
guards would not be infringing upon any constitutional right the inmate might
have.'01
A year later, in Madyun v. Franzen10 2 the Seventh Circuit emphasized the
importance it placed on equal employment opportunities over claims by inmates of
violations of their constitutional rights. Relying on Smith, the court dismissed plain-
tiff's claim that a pat down search by female guards violated his right to privacy. 10 3
Plaintiff also claimed that the search violated his first amendment right to the free
exercise of religion. 10 4 In the court's opinion, prison rules which incidentally re-
strained the free exercise of religion would be justified only if the state regulation has
an important objective and the restraint on religious liberty is reasonably adapted to
achieving that objective.' 5 Rather than finding the important objective to be prison
security, the court found it to be equal employment opportunity. '0 6 Accordingly, the
regulation was justified. Finally, plaintiff claimed a denial of equal protection in that
the prison's regulations allowed male inmates to be frisked by male or female guards,
but female inmates could be frisked only by female guards. '07 The court responded,
"[S]ince the distinction that allows women guards to search male inmates advances
this important state interest [equalizing job opportunities], we hold that it passes
muster under the equal protection clause."' 08
Cumbey v. Meachum is a final example of the derogation of inmates' right to
privacy to protect equal employment opportunities of prison guards of the opposite
98. Frisk searches involve a pat down of the inmate's outer clothing for the purpose of determining whether the
inmate is carrying weapons or contraband. Id. at 53.
99. Id. at 54.
100. Id. at 55.
101. Id.
102. 704 F.2d 954 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 493 (1983).
103. Id. at 957.
104. It was not contested that plaintiff was a Muslim, that his beliefs were sincere, and that the tenets of his religion
forbade physical contact with a woman other than his wife or mother. Id.
105. Id. at 960 (quoting LaReau v. MacDougal, 473 F.2d 974, 979 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878
(1973)).
106. Id. at 960.
107. Id. at 961.
108. Id. at 963.
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sex.'" 9 In Cumbey the lower court dismissed a male inmate's complaint of a privacy
violation by a female guard as frivolous, finding that the plaintiff could not make any
rational argument on the law or facts to support his claim." 0 The Tenth Circuit
reversed and remanded concluding that "[a]lthough the inmate's right to privacy
must yield to the penal institution's need to maintain security, it does not vanish
altogether.""' Although the court of appeals remanded, the district court's decision
reflects more closely the trend in the federal courts to abrogate seriously inmates'
rights when the rights are balanced against equal employment opportunities.
The problem in Smith, Madyun, and Cumbey is the failure on the part of each
court to analyze an inmate's constitutional right of privacy. No discussion appears in
these cases on the basis of the right. Each of these cases begins with the premise that
any rights an inmate possesses necessarily are diminished by his or her in-
carceration. 112 The issue, then, becomes one of how much the right can be di-
minished, rather than whether consideration of equal employment opportunity in the
prison setting now needs to be modified because it is conflicting with legitimate
security and rehabilitative goals.
III. A SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. Standard of Review-Deference to the Prison Administrator as
Representative of the State Legislative and Executive Branches of the
Government
When claims of constitutional violations have been brought by inmates against
prison administrators, the Supreme Court has utilized the rational relationship test.
The Court consistently has held that the courts should defer to the prison administra-
tor who implements the policies of the legislative and executive branches of the
government in the area of prison administration. " 3 This deference reflects no more
than a "healthy sense of realism" 14 that the prison administrator, and not the federal
court, is the expert in this area.
109. 684 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1982).
110. Id. at 714.
111. Id.
112. Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 54 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1879 (1983); Madyun v. Franzen,
704 F.2d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 1983); Cumbey v. Meachum, 684 F.2d 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1982).
113. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548-49 (1979); Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 127-29 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 471 U.S. 817, 827 (1974);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974).
114. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 138 (1977). The District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina had granted to inmates the right to solicit union membership. The court said no consensus
existed among experts whether such activity constituted a security threat and the prison administrator had therefore failed
to meet the burden of proving that it would in fact constitute such a threat. Disagreeing, the Supreme Court responded:
"The district court, we believe, got off on the wrong foot in this case by not giving appropriate deference to the decisions
of prison administrators and appropriate recognition to the peculiar and restrictive circumstances of penal confinement."
Id. at 125.
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The Court has reiterated this position as recently as 1981 in Rhodes v. Chap-
man.
123
The Supreme Court consistently has held that the prison environment is unique
and that traditional rules that apply to free society must be modified to meet this
environment. 124 Even when an inmate claims a violation of his or her constitutional
rights, the court must defer to the prison administrator's judgment unless the heavy
burden of proving unreasonableness is met. 22 The administrator is not required to
show alternative ways of approaching the problem or that a danger to the security of
the institution has in fact occurred. 126 If, using this standard, the court finds the
actions to be constitutionally prohibited, the prison administrator should fashion a
remedy to cure the problem. 127
Although this standard of review consistently has been applied in cases between
inmates and prison authorities, the federal courts have refused to apply it in equal
employment opportunity cases. 128 This refusal constitutes an abuse of discretion by
the federal courts. Although Dothard did not clearly state which standard was being
applied, the Court did not invalidate the prison administrator's position that women
could be employed in the male minimum and medium security prisons but not in the
maximum security prisons. Nor did the Court in Dothard consider whether remedial
measures should be undertaken to allow female guards in the male maximum security
prisons. 129 This standard of review should not be altered merely because the compet-
ing interest in equal employment opportunity cases in the prison setting is that of
private citizens rather than inmates.
In Bell v. Wolfish 13 0 the argument was made that deference to prison administra-
tors was required only in cases brought by inmates against the prison and did not
apply in cases brought by pretrial detainees (citizens who had been charged with a
crime and held without bail but who had not yet been tried on the charge). 131 The
Court disagreed, explaining that although previous decisions had involved inmates,
the reasons for deferring to the informed discretion of the prison administrator were
the complexity of running a penal institution, the inability of the courts to deal with
the problem, and the fact that the management of the institutions reposed in the
legislative and executive branches of the government. "While those cases each
concerned restrictions governing convicted inmates, the principles of deference
enunciated in them is not dependent on that happenstance."' 132 In Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union133 the Court added, "Moreover, where state penal
123. 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981).
124. See Hudson v. Thomas, 52 U.S.L.W. 5052, 5054 (July 3, 1984), Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983);
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352-53 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548-49 (1979); Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 127 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 567 (1974); Pell v,
Procunier, 471 U.S. 817, 827 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974).
125. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977).
126. Id. at 132.
127. Id. at 137.
128. See supra notes 30-62 and accompanying text.
129. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336-37 (1977).
130. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
131. Id. at 548, n.29.
132. Id.
133. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
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The solutions to problems arising within correctional facilities will never be simple or
easy. Prisons, by definitions, are closed societies populated by individuals who have
demonstrated their inability, or refusal, to conform their conduct to the norms demanded
by a civilized society. Of necessity, rules far different from those imposed on society at
large must prevail within prison walls. The federal courts, as we have often noted, are not
equipped by experience or otherwise to "second guess" the decisions of state legislatures
and administrators in this sensitive area except in the most extraordinary circum-
stances. 115
The standard of review for the court begins with the presumption that the actions
of the prison administrator are reasonable. 116 Absent a showing that the belief that
led to the action was unreasonable, the court may not substitute its own opinion and
may not place upon the prison administrator the affirmative burden of justifying the
action taken. "' This standard is based upon the notion that it is the administrator who
is most intimately familiar with the physical structure of the prison, the size and
capabilities of the prison guard force, and the character of the inmate population.
This expertise develops with actual day-to-day experience and training, not from
esoteric reflections of what conditions and circumstances ought to be.
Despite the Supreme Court's admonition that deference should be given to the
prison administrator's judgment, the federal courts have continued to become overly
involved. " 8 One of the most flagrant examples was the district court's actions in Bell
v. Wolfish. "9 In Bell the District Court for the Southern District of New York, in a
decision that was in large part affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
intervened broadly into almost every facet of the penal institution enjoining no fewer
than twenty of the institution's practices. 120 The district court did so based upon its
belief that the prison administrator had failed to sustain the affirmative burden of
showing the practices were instituted due to an actual security threat or that less
restrictive measures were not available. 121 The Supreme Court flatly rejected this
reasoning and admonished:
[C]ourts have, in the name of the Constitution, become increasingly enmeshed in the
minutiae of prison operations. Judges, after all, are human. They, no less than others in
our society, have a natural tendency to believe that their individual solutions to often
intractable problems are better and more workable than those of the persons who are
actually charged with and trained in the running of the particular institution under ex-
amination. But under the Constitution, the first question to be answered is not whose plan
is best, but in what branch of the Government is lodged the authority to initially devise the
plan .... [T]he inquiry of federal courts into prison management must be limited to the
issue of whether a particular system violates any prohibition of the Constitution .... 122
115. Id. at 137 (Burger, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 128.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S. 215 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 471 U.S. 817 (1974).
119. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
120. United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
121. 428 F. Supp. 333, 340 (S.D.N.Y.) (granting partial summary judgment).
122. 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979).
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institutions are involved federal courts have a further reason for deference to the
appropriate prison authorities." 
134
By supplanting their own solution for that of the prison administrator on how the
competing interests best can be reconciled rather than restricting their analysis to
whether the administrator's actions are unreasonable, the federal courts are usurping
the states' responsibility to regulate state prisons. The courts improperly are sub-
stituting their own opinions of the effect of guards of the opposite sex on the inmate
population rather than deferring to the states' opinion. As the Supreme Court in Bell
v. Wolfish 135 held "[T]he inquiry of federal courts into prison management must be
limited to the issue of whether a particular system violates any prohibition of the
Constitution .... 136
The diverse opinions of experts, state administrators, and federal courts on the
impact of hiring guards of a sex opposite that of the inmates in the prison setting
support the notion that deference to the prison administrator should be employed.
Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in Dothard argued that the use of female
guards in male prisons would help to normalize the environment in the prison and
further the goal of rehabilitation.
Presumably, one of the goals of the Alabama prison system is the eradication of inmates'
antisocial behavior pattern so that prisoners will be able to live one day in a free society.
Sex offenders can begin this process by learning to relate to women guards in a socially
acceptable manner.137
Without discussing the psychological question of whether placing female guards
in superior positions over sex offenders assists the rehabilitative process, some feder-
al courts have utilized the general argument that guards of the opposite sex do help to
normalize the environment. In Griffin v. Michigan Department of Corrections138 the
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan opined, "Eradicating the dis-
criminatory treatment toward women will not only be fair, equitable and bring
Defendants' policies and practices into harmony with the state of the law under Title
VII, but it will also make for a healthier and more rehabilitative atmosphere for the
inmates." 139 In Hardin v. Stynchcomb 140 the Eleventh Circuit approved the district
134. Id. at 126 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)). This deference to the state was enunciated by
the Court in Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) in which the Court explained:
It is difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound
up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the administration of its prisons. The relationship of state
prisoners and the state officers who supervise their confinement is far more intimate than that of a State and a
private citizen .... What for a private citizen would be a dispute with his landlord, with his employer, with
his tailor, with his neighbor, or with his banker becomes, for the prisoner, a dispute with the State. Since these
internal problems of state prisons involve issues so peculiarly within state authority and expertise, the States
have an important interest in not being bypassed in the correction of those problems . . . . The strong con-
siderations of comity that require giving a state court system that has convicted a defendant the first opportunity
to correct its own errors thus also require giving the States the first opportunity to correct the errors made in the
internal administration of their prisons.
Id. at 491 (footnote omitted).
135. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
136. Id. at 562.
137. 433 U.S. 321, 346 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
138. 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,482 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 1982).
139. Id. at 29,222.
140. 691 F.2d 1364 (1lth Cir. 1982).
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court's statement that "It]he presence of women may, in fact, contribute to the
normalization of the prison environment." 
14 1
This argument has been flatly rejected, however, by other courts. In Bowling v.
Enomoto' 42 the court said:
Defendants do not argue, and indeed they could not convincingly argue, that the practice
of allowing female officers to view male inmates in the nude furthers the penological
interest of rehabilitation. On the contrary, in the normal social setting which prison
inmates are ostensibly being rehabilitated to function within, people do not undress,
bathe, or defecate in the presence of strangers of the opposite sex. 1
43
The argument also was rejected by the California Third Circuit Court of Appeals
in In re Long, 144 a case dealing with a juvenile detention center that employed a staff
of both sexes. The court noted the state's position that employing members of both
sexes helped to normalize the environment but also noted that this position had
received its impetus from legal pressures to avoid the BFOQ exception. 145
In a normal social setting young men of 19 do not undress, bathe, void or excrete in the
maternal presence. They are not forced to disrobe in the bathroom to escape female
surveillance. Far from normalizing the environment, the presence of female observers in
these areas of the institution violates the norms of privacy prevailing in free society.1
46
This was also the position of the Maryland District Court in Hudson v.
Goodlander.'4 7 "Such a practice aggravates, rather than mitigates, the disparity
between the prison environment and society at large.'
148
The courts are also in conflict whether remedial measures are appropriate.
Although federal courts have required the employer to prove that it is impossible to
accommodate the competing interests, 149 the court in In re Long 150 held otherwise.
[Tihe institutional authorities have been at some pains to ameliorate the exposure by
installing frosted glass and partitions. The institution's necessities, however, call for
unceasing staff surveillance of wards. That need belies the feasibility of supplying wards
with places of concealment. When undressing in the bedroom, when bathing, urinating or
defecating, the wards must be either visible to the observer, partially visible or available
for visibility. When the observer is female, an invasion of privacy occurs which is not
justified by institutional needs.' 5'
141. Id. at 1367, n.9 (quoting Hardin v. Stynchcomb, No. 77-5974A, slip op. at 14-15 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 21, 1980)).
142. 514 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
143. Id. at 203-04.
144. 127 Cal. Rptr. 732, 736-37 (Ct. App. 1976).
145. Id. at 737.
146. Id.
147. 494 F. Supp. 890 (D. Md. 1980).
148. Id. at 893.
149. See, e.g., Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364 (1Ith Cir. 1982); Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation
Center, 520 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa
1979), affd, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980); Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated and remanded, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980).
150. 127 Cal. Rptr. 732 (Ct. App. 1976). See also Iowa Dep't of Social Services v. Iowa Merit Employment Dep't,
261 N.W.2d 161, 167 (Iowa 1977) in which the Iowa Supreme Court said, "We do not believe the institution should be
required to substantially adjust its physical plant or procedure in order to support the imposition of a classification."
151. 127 Cal. Rptr. 732, 737 (Ct. App. 1976).
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The court in Griffin v. Michigan Department of Corrections152 distinguished In
re Long because "[i]n the context of youth detention facilities, state courts have been
understandably more zealous to protect the privacy rights of young peo-
ple .... [T]he humiliation and embarrassment which some children might feel could
result in the loss of self-esteem that would hinder an individual's rehabilitation." 153
Several state courts also have refused to require remedial measures and subsequently
have been contradicted by the federal courts. '5 4 It is difficult to understand courts
such as Griffin, which apparently believe that the rehabilitation of juveniles could be
hampered by having mixed guard staffs but that mixed guard staffs do not affect
adults. The argument that the resulting loss of self-esteem would hinder an in-
dividual's rehabilitation should be just as forceful in the prison context as it is in the
juvenile setting, and the federal courts should not circumvent a rational determination
made by the state that the inmates' rehabilitation would suffer.
The divergent assessments of the impact of the use of guards of the opposite sex
from that of the inmate population illustrates need for deference to the state executive
and legislative determination that a BFOQ is proper in this setting. The authorities
should make the determination of how best to achieve the goals of their prison
systems. If the states believe that guards of the opposite sex of the prisoners do not
normalize the environment, cause a security threat by disrupting the prison popula-
tion, and invade the prisoner's right to some semblance of privacy and decide that a
BFOQ is the proper approach to resolve this problem, this decision should not be
disturbed by the federal courts.
Additionally, the federal courts' independent decisionmaking process has put
them in direct conflict with state authorities on several occasions. 155 The extent to
which the use of guards of the opposite sex conflict with an inmate's right to privacy
and the corresponding effect on prison administration is best left to the state. Thus,
despite its decision that inmates possess only a limited right to privacy, the Seventh
Circuit in Smith v. Fairman156 correctly noted that: " [t]he community's standards are
obviously prime concerns in deciding how to regulate contacts, relationships, and
exercises of authority between people of opposite sexes. Judges are not by office or
training specially qualified as the regulators."' 57
In Griffin v. Michigan Department of Corrections,158 in which a federal court
dealt with Michigan's prison system, the policy of allowing women to be transferred
and promoted to all correctional facilities except for the three maximum security
prisons had been approved directly by the State Department of Civil Service and
indirectly by the State Department of Civil Rights and the State Attorney General. ' 59
152. 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,482 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 1982).
153. 1d. at 29,221.
154. See infra notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
156. 678 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1879 (1983).
157. Id. at 55 (quoting United States ex rel. wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
158. 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,482 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 1982).
159. Id. at 29,216.
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In Carey v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board,16 0 the New York State
Appellate Division affirmed the finding of the New York State Division of Human
Rights and held that under New York law, sex was a BFOQ for the position of
correction officer in an all male correction facility.
[O]ur examination of the record and our own judicial common sense makes it clear that
the qualification is required .... [B]oth the needs of the correctional facilities to main-
tain security by such means as body searches and the needs of the inmates for privacy in
those aspects of their lives in confinement which involve such matters as baths, or
showers, medical examination and treatment and their psychological security, which is
necessary to promote the rehabilitative phases of their confinement, combine to provide a
rational basis and a governmental need for limiting contacts in such circumstances to
correction officers of the same sex as that of the inmates.
16
Relying upon Carey, the New York Court of Appeals reached the same decision
in Reynolds v. Kramarsky. 162 Plaintiff then filed with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission and subsequently brought suit in federal court. 163 Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata. 164 The district court denied
the motion, stating, "Carey seems to conflict with federal decisions, and it is quite
likely that plaintiffs federal claim will not fail simply because of the BFOQ excep-
tion contained in Title VII."' 165 In a footnote to this statement the court commented
that, although the New York court's decision might appear more realistic, this did not
justify the court's ignoring the substantial body of controlling federal law.' 66
In Iowa Department of Social Services v. Iowa Merit Employment De-
partment167 the Iowa Supreme Court found that under Iowa law, a BFOQ existed on
which the state could premise a correction officer II classification according to
sex. 168 Plaintiff then filed in federal court under Title VII. 169 Defendant's motion for
dismissal on the grounds of res judicata was denied because the state and federal laws
created separate causes of action and could be subject to different standards. 170 The
district court's decision, which was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
denied the application of a BFOQ. 17 1
160. 61 A.D.2d 804, 402 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1978), affd, 46 N.Y.2d 1068, 390 N.E.2d 301, 416 N.Y.S.2d 794
(1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 891 (1979).
161. Id. at 805, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 208-09.
162. 64 A.D.2d 636, 407 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1978).
163. Reynolds v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 568 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
164. Id. at 749.
165. Id. at 751 (footnote omitted).
166. Id. at 751, n.8.
167. 261 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1977).
168. The court reviewed the duties of a correction officer II and determined that it was impossible to separate the
classification from the duties the female plaintiff could not perform without violating inmates' constitutional privacy
rights. The essential function, although flexible, demanded close personal contact with inmates and intimate inmate
surveillance. In recognizing the BFOQ, the court concluded, "The civil rights act permits reasonable classifications of
employees based on sex, and an employer is required to neither pattern a job for a woman or man, nor accept an
inefficient mode of operation. 14 C.J.S. Supp. Civil Rights § 68, p. 120 (1974). See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
331, 97 S. Ct. 2720, 2728, 53 L.Ed.2d 786, 799 (1977) n. 14." Id. at 167.
169. Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979), affd, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
170. 462 F. Supp. 952, 954 (N.D. Iowa 1979).
171. 462 F. Supp. 952, 958, affld, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980).
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In Percy v. Allen 172 the state trial court had upheld a BFOQ for the Maine State
Prison on the grounds of the character of the inmate population and the public
interests in protecting an inmate's right to privacy. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine overruled, finding that the state legislation reflected an intent for the state
courts to look to federal case law in the area of antidiscrimination. 173 A concurring
opinion raised a concern that federal law dominated state decisions. "If every deci-
sion in a claim of discrimination is to start with the answer provided by the federal
courts, the Maine Human Rights Act will not long remain responsive to the particular
needs and circumstances of the people of the State of Maine." 1
74
In sum, federal courts have disregarded state law. As the decisions of the federal
courts make clear, absent identical Dothard conditions (which no other prison has or
would want to meet), a BFOQ is not justified.175 Whenever a state affirms a BFOQ,
plaintiff can proceed to federal court under Title VII and have the state court decision
nullified.
B. Proper Presentation of Inmates' Privacy Interests
Even if the federal courts refuse to defer to the legislative and executive bran-
ches of state government in equal employment opportunity claims in the prison
setting, a different approach needs to be utilized in balancing the competing interests
of inmate privacy and equal employment opportunity. At present, when guards file
suit, the prison administrator is given only limited standing to represent the inmates'
privacy interests.' 7 6 This results in a less than complete analysis of the inmates'
interests and places the prison administrator in the position of being confronted with
additional lawsuits by inmates. Inmate rights must give way because the court has
previously determined that a BFOQ is improper.
The prison administrator should have standing to represent the inmates' in-
terests. "' This was the position in Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware,178 a case
cited by several federal courts in support of the requirement that remedial measures
be examined to balance the competing interests before allowing a BFOQ.17 9 Fesel
concerned a nursing home for the elderly. Plaintiff claimed he was denied a position
as a nurse's aide on the basis of his sex. 180 The Delaware District Court held that
when an employer was claiming a BFOQ defense based upon the employer's percep-
tion of the privacy interests of its clients or customers rather than the employee's
physical capacity to perform the job, the employer must establish not only the
172. 449 A.2d 337 (Me. 1982).
173. Id. at 342.
174. Id. at 346 (Walthen, J., concurring).
175. See supra notes 30-62 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
177. Alternatively, the argument should be made that to deny such standing requires that the inmates be joined as
indispensable parties.
178. 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), affd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
179. See, e.g., Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1086 (8th Cir.), cert. denied. 446 U.S.
966(1980); Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center, 520 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Hardin v. Stynchcomb,
691 F.2d 1364, 1371 (1lth Cir. 1982).
180. 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1349 (D. Del. 1978).
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primary purpose test of Diaz but also that, due to the nature of the business, it would
not be possible to assign job responsibilities in a selective manner so as to avoid
colliding with the customers' privacy rights.'8s The court concluded, "Here personal
privacy interests are implicated which are protected by law and which have to be
recognized by the employer in running its business.'
182
By allowing the employer to represent its customers' interests, the court prop-
erly could balance the privacy interests with the claim of denial of equal employment
opportunity. These two interests then could be reconciled with the primary purpose of
the nursing home-providing care to the elderly. In Fesel the court decided that,
based upon the facts of this particular case, the employer was unable to accommodate
the competing interests. "[W]here a duty of accommodation exists, it nevertheless
falls short of requiring an employer to sacrifice either efficiency or wages to
accommodate the employee." 8 3 The court therefore held that the "Masonic Home
has met its burden of proof and has successfully established a BFOQ defense based
upon the privacy interests of its guests."'
184
This was also the court's view in Iowa Department of Social Services v. Iowa
Merit Employment Department'85 in which the Iowa Men's Reformatory was the
defendant. The inmates were not a party to the suit. The court noted that, "[C]on-
sideration of inmates' constitutional rights requires mention of another threshold
question. Were the inmates' constitutional rights an issue raised in these proceedings?
We think the answer is plainly yes. The inmates' constitutional right of privacy was
an issue at every step in these proceedings."' 186
Refusing to allow the prison administrator fully to represent the inmates' privacy
interests results in a biased balancing approach. When guards file suit, prison admi-
nistrators are limited to inmates' rights in relation to prison security 18 7 or are accused
of raising the defense as a sham to continue their alleged discriminatory practices. 188
The issue of the inmate's constitutional right as balanced against a person's statutory
right under Title VII is not considered.
Although the Supreme Court, as noted in United States v. Hinckley, 18 9 has never
considered the extent to which convicted prisoners are protected by the fourth amend-
ment's guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches and the general right of
personal privacy, the Court has held, "There is no iron curtain drawn between the
181. Id. at 1351.
182. Id. at 1352.
183. Id. at 1354, n.12.
184. Id. at 1354.
185. 261 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1977). Plaintiff subsequently filed in federal court. Defendants' motion for dismissal
on the grounds of res judicata was denied on the basis that state and federal laws created separate causes of action. The
federal court disallowed the BFOQ defense. Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952, 954 (N.D.
Iowa 1979), affd, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
186. Id. at 164.
187. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
189. 672 F.2d 115, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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Constitution and the prisons of this country." 1 90 The analysis of the particular gov-
ernmental invasion of a citizen's personal security must always be the reasonableness
in all of the. circumstances.1 9 ' In Bell v. Wolfish,192 which dealt with strip searches of
male inmates by male guards, the Court concluded:
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise
definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for
the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts
must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted,
the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted. 193
In Bell, therefore, the Court balanced the legitimate security interest of the institution
against the privacy interests of the inmate.
When a guard files suit and the prison raises the BFOQ defense based upon an
inmate's privacy rights, the balancing test must be one in which the competing
interests of a citizen's statutory Title VII rights and an inmate's constitutional privacy
right are examined and reconciled under the rubric of the prison setting, where the
primary purposes are security, rehabilitation, and deterrence.' 94 The current analysis
used by the federal courts when a suit is brought by guards is to balance the guards'
rights against the prison's security interests. When suit is brought by inmates, the
federal courts balance the inmates' privacy rights against the prison's need to provide
equal employment opportunity. Neither approach properly identifies or resolves the
issues. The federal courts have refused to allow the prison administrator to represent
the inmates' interest in the former but have automatically required the prison admin-
istrator to represent the employees' interest in the latter. This biased approach en-
sures that equal employment opportunity will always be given preferential treatment.
The fallacy of this analysis was pointed out by the Oregon Supreme Court in
Sterling v. Cupp.195 In Sterling male inmates brought suit to enjoin prison officials
from assigning female guards to prison duties involving searches. The female guards
intervened. The inmates did not claim that the searches in themselves were improper
but, rather, that when they were performed by a member of the opposite sex, the
searches were a needless indignity and an imposition because they went beyond a
recognized necessity. The court analyzed the right to privacy separately from equal
employment opportunity and the prison's security concerns. The court reasoned that,
like punishment, what was or was not an indignity was largely a matter of social and
190. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,555-56 (1974). The recent Supreme Court decision of Hudson v. Thomas,
52 U.S.L.W. 5052 (July 3, 1984) limits this statement to the extent the Court held that the fourth amendment has no
applicability to a prison cell. In Hudson respondent, an inmate at a Virginia penal institution, claimed he was entitled to
fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches of his cell. The Court balanced the reasonableness of the
prisoner's expectation of privacy in his prison cell against the prison administrator's need to conduct random searches to
insure prison security. Based upon this analysis, the Court held in favor of the prison." It would be impossible to
accomplish the prison objectives of preventing the introduction of weapons, drugs, and other contraband into the premises
if inmates retained a right of privacy in their cells." Id. at 5052. The decision was limited to cell privacy and there is no
discussion of the limits of any personal privacy rights as discussed in the context of this Comment.
191. United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,
109 (1977)).
192. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
193. Id. at 559.
194. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974).
195. 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981).
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individual psychology. 196 The court took notice of the Federal Standards for Correc-
tions and the American Correctional Association's Manual of Correctional Standards
which both outlined guidelines to assure privacy to female prisoners. These guide-
lines included not allowing guards of the opposite sex to search newly admitted
prisoners.' 97 Based upon these guidelines and judicial notice that society at large
found such contact offensive, the court decided it made little sense to hold men were
entitled to any less consideration of their right to privacy.'
98
Therefore, to justify female guards searching male inmates, the state had to
prove necessity. 199 The state claimed that its desire to provide equal employment
opportunity provided the requisite necessity. The court disagreed and clarified the
competing interests:
[D]espite the diverging objectives of the two groups, the law does not pit the rights
of prisoners against those of correction officers. The prisoners' rights, like all con-
stitutional rights, run against the state. Similarly, the officers' rights to equal employment
opportunities are claims upon the state .... [T]heir interest is in sharing the economic
and noneconomic opportunities in an occupation in which government is effectively the
only employer.
In the present case, the claim for relief before the trial court is that of prisoners, not
of correction officers .... Such rights do not serve OSP [Oregon State Penitentiary] as a
reason why disregard of otherwise protected prisoner interests ... is "necessary. 200
Defendants, therefore, were enjoined from allowing female guards to conduct
pat down or frisk searches absent a situation in which immediate circumstances
justified necessity. The court also noted that during pendency of the appeal, the
defendants had promulgated administrative rules providing that, except in cases of
emergency, only guards of the same sex as the prisoners could conduct searches of
any kind or have, as part of their regular duties, assignments in which inmates would
be observed in open showers, in toilets, or in the nude. The court told defendants to
move to have the injunction lifted on the grounds they adequately regulated the
challenged practice and, therefore, judicial intervention was no longer necessary or
appropriate. 20
1
The approach of the court in Sterling is the approach that should be taken by the
federal courts. The Sterling court limited its review of the prison administrator's
actions to whether they were reasonable in light of constitutional requirements. 20 2
The court distinguished the citizen's and the inmate's rights as separate claims
against the state.20 3 The court found the administrator's actions were not con-
stitutionally permissible as they overly infringed upon the inmate's right to privacy.
However, rather than trying to fashion a remedy, as the federal courts have done, the
196. Id. at 623, 625 P.2d at 132.
197. Id. at 621-22, 625 P.2d at 130-31.
198. Id. at 625, 625 P.2d at 133.
199. Id. at 625-26, 625 P.2d at 133.
200. Id. at 626-28, 625 P.2d at 133-34.
201. Id. at 632, 625 P.2d at 136.
202. The court's decision was based upon the Oregon rather than the United States Constitution, Id.
203, 290 Or. 611, 628, 625 P.2d 123, 134 (1981).
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Sterling court deferred to the remedy created by the state in the new administrative
rules and found them to be reasonable.
20 4
C. Effect of Federal Courts' Failure to Apply the Deference Standard and Properly
Consider Inmates' Rights
The present approach taken by the federal courts in equal employment opportu-
nity claims in the prison setting has several drawbacks. The approach fails to take into
account the proper role to be played by the judicial, as compared to the executive and
legislative branches of the government, especially when a state system is involved.
The approach also fails to consider fully the competing interests and, in turn, im-
properly derogates inmates' privacy rights, leaves the administrator without adequate
guidelines, and opens the door for future litigation.
The prison environment is unique in our society and requires rules far different
from those imposed on society at large.2 °5 Courts are in conflict as to the effect of
guards of a sex opposite that of the inmate in the prison setting20 6 and whether the
particular circumstances of a prison system support a BFOQ. 20 7 This area is ex-
tremely sensitive and is one in which federal courts are ill-equipped to second guess
the decisions of the state legislatures, which know better their community's mores
and how legitimate penal objectives best can be achieved. When the federal courts
require prison administrators to rearrange job assignments or make structural changes
to accomodate Title VII, the courts not only derogate inmates' rights without fully
considering them but also proceed upon the belief "that their individual solutions to
often intractable problems are better and more workable than those of the persons
who are actually charged with and trained in the running of the particular in-
stitution .... 28
This confusion is exemplified in several cases. In Hardin v. Stynchcomb209 the
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia had ruled that jail conditions
justified a BFOQ.2 0 The Eleventh Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, held that jail conditions
did not justify a BFOQ. 21' The dissenting judge would have affirmed the district
court's ruling based upon the facts of this particular case. He felt that it was impos-
sible to accommodate the equal employment opportunity interests of the female
guards without hampering prison security and violating the inmates' rights to
privacy. 212 In Forts v. Ward,213 although both the district court and court of appeals
were reluctant to recognize a BFOQ, they disagreed over the accommodations, with
the court of appeals believing that the district court should have spent more time
considering the type of sleepwear that was available. 2 14 In Hardin the court was
204. Id. at 632, 625 P.2d at 136.
205. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 137 (1977).
206. See supra notes 128-48 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 150-74 and accompanying text.
208. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979).
209. 692 F.2d 1364 (1lth Cir. 1982).
210. Hardin v. Stynchcomb, No. 77-597A (N.D. Ga. Oct. 21, 1980).
211. 691 F.2d 1364, 1374 (11th Cir. 1982).
212. Id. at 1376 (Clark, J., dissenting).
213. 471 F. Supp. 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated and remanded, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980).
214. 621 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir. 1980).
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substituting its opinion for that of the prison administrator. In Forts the court was
becoming enmeshed in the minutiae of day to day prison administration.
The federal courts have lost sight of the need for a penal system to be judged on
its own facts like the Court did in Dothard rather than by a comparison to systems in
other states. The states' penal objectives, physical prison conditions, and inmate
population character are not uniform. When the federal courts impose their own
requirements, the courts place themselves in direct conflict with the state and can, in
fact, undermine the prison's primary purposes of security or rehabilitation.
Additionally, the federal courts' refusal to allow the prison administrator to
represent the inmates' privacy interests or to limit the representation to penological
security concerns fails to take properly into account the competing interests and, in
turn, undermines the role of the prison administrator. When the state legislative and
executive branches are deciding how prison objectives of security and rehabilitation
best can be accomplished in the context of guards of a sex opposite that of the
inmates, they must also consider an inmate's privacy rights and how the two interests
best can be balanced without having a detrimental effect on the prison's primary
purposes. The federal courts should do no less. The present approach allows the
federal courts to dismiss legitimate penological concerns based upon speculation.2 15
However, this contradicts the Supreme Court's conclusion that such deference is
necessary.
In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union2 16 inmates brought suit
because the prison administrator had regulated the inmates' union activities. The
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina ruled in favor of the inmates
because there was "no consensus" among experts on these matters, 2 17 and not one
"scintilla of evidence to suggest that the Union has been utilized to disrupt the
operation of the penal institutions.' '218 The Supreme Court reversed because the
district court had failed to give proper deference to the prison administrator or
appropriate recognition to the peculiar and restrictive circumstances of penal confine-
ment.
The interest in preserving order and authority in the prisons is self-evident. Prison life,
and relations between the inmates themselves and between the inmates and prison offi-
cials or staff, contain the ever present potential for violent confrontation and conflagra-
tion. Responsible prison officials must be permitted to take reasonable steps to forestall
such a threat, and they must be permitted to act before the time when they can compile a
dossier on the eve of a riot. 2 19
When the courts refuse to address the inmates' privacy rights, prison administra-
tors are left without guidelines on the extent to which guard positions are limited.
When prison administrators assign guards to positions regardless of sex, administra-
tors are found to have violated an inmate's constitutional right of privacy. Hudson v.
Goodlander illustrates this problem.2 20 Prior to 1979 the prison administrator had
215. Griffin v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. 33,482 at 29,217 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12,
1982); Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center, 520 F. Supp. 769, 775 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
216. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
217. 409 F. Supp. 937, 942 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
218. Id. at 944.
219. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 132-33 (1977) (citation omitted).
220. 494 F. Supp. 890 (D. Md. 1980).
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restricted guard positions by sex where inmate nudity regularly occurred. In 1979 the
prison administrator opened up positions regardless of sex because male guards were
complaining of receiving a disproportionate share of the onerous assignments and
female guards were complaining that their opportunity for advancement was limited
by their inability to become familiar with all facets of the institution. 22' The male
prisoners then filed suit. The court held that the inmates' privacy rights had been
violated.2 22 In response to plaintiffs' claim for damages, however, the court con-
cluded:
An examination of the case law in this area reveals a wide disparity in the judicially
mandated accommodation of equal employment opportunity policies and privacy interests
of inmates. The defendants clearly attempted to conform their conduct to what they
perceive to be the constitutional norm. Given the importance of each of the competing
interests, and the relative dearth of clear judicial guidance in this area, the Court finds that
the defendants acted reasonably, albeit incorrectly, in setting the challenged policy.'
23
The court in Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center224 also realized
the dilemma it was creating. "While the Defendants' desire to avoid a multiplicity of
lawsuits is understandable, the Court must adhere to established concepts of jus-
ticiability, which prohibit the determination of issues not having 'sufficient im-
mediacy and reality' to merit the invocation of the Court's jurisdiction. ' 225
IV. CONCLUSION
When a claim of denial of equal employment opportunity in the state prison
setting is brought in the federal courts, the review should be limited to whether a
constitutional violation has occurred. The court should defer to the actions taken by
the prison administrators as representatives of the state legislative and executive
branches of the government if the actions are found to be reasonable. If the court
believes that a constitutional infringement has occurred, the court should detail the
nature of the constitutional violation and then defer to the prison administrator to
fashion a remedy. By properly addressing the separate issues of an inmate's right to
privacy and a person's right to equal employment opportunity under the rubric of the
prison's primary purposes and by recognizing a BFOQ when it is a reasonable way in
which to balance these competing interests, the prison administrator has appropriate
guidelines for fashioning remedies and utilizing a BFOQ when necessary. When the
federal court supplants its opinion for that of the state legislative and executive
branches and refuses to allow prison administrators to represent inmates' privacy
concerns, the court abuses its discretion, increases litigation, and further derogates an
inmate's constitutional rights.
Catherine B. Crandall
221. Id. at 892.
222. Id. at 893.
223. Id. at 895.
224. 520 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
225. Id. at 782 (citations omitted).
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